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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-3915 
____________ 
 
STEVEN ADDLESPURGER, 
     Appellant  
v. 
 
TOM CORBETT, Pennsylvania State Attorney General 
in his official and individual capacities; STEPHEN 
ZAPPALLA, Allegheny County District Attorney 
in his official and individual capacities; DONNA JO 
MCDANIELS, President Judge Allegheny County Fifth 
Judicial District in her professional and individual 
capacities; RAYMOND BILLOTTE, Administration 
of Pennsylvania Courts Fifth Judicial District in his 
official and individual capacities; KIM BERKELEY 
CLARK, Administrative Judge in her professional and 
individual capacities; PATRICK QUINN, Domestic 
Relations Services in his official and individual 
capacities; DAVID WECHT, Judge in his official and 
individual capacities; WILLIAM MULLEN, Sheriff in 
his official and individual capacities; DAN ONORATO, 
Chief Executive of Allegheny County and in his official 
and individual capacities; RAMON RUSTIN, Jail 
Warden in his official and individual capacities; 
DANIEL RICHARDS, Department of Public Welfare 
in his official and individual capacities; MICHAEL H. 
WOJCIK, County solicitors in his official and individual 
capacities; KATE BARKMAN, Department of Court 
records in her professional and individual capacities 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-09-cv-01064) 
District Judge: David Stewart Cercone 
__________________________________ 
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Submitted on Motions for Summary Affirmance 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 20, 2012 
 
Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 9, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Steven Addlespurger filed a pro se complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, seeking injunctive relief against 
the Family Division of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas.  Addlespurger, 
who was a defendant in a support action filed by his wife, Julie Addlespurger, sought to 
enjoin an upcoming contempt proceeding, and complained that he had been subjected to 
numerous contempt orders, and had been incarcerated in the Allegheny County Jail.  He 
contended that the prior contempt orders were entered in violation of his due process 
rights, and he sought an order enjoining the Family Division from holding the upcoming 
contempt proceeding, and an order staying further proceedings in the Family Division. 
Addlespurger consented to proceedings before a Magistrate Judge, 28 U.S.C. § 
636(c)(1), who viewed the complaint as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 
2254, and transferred it here for consideration of whether to grant leave to file a 
successive petition.  (Addlespurger had filed a prior habeas corpus petition, challenging 
the Family Division’s contempt orders for non-payment of child support.)  Upon its 
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transfer here, we concluded that Addlespurger’s pro se complaint should have been 
viewed as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injunctive relief based on 
alleged due process violations in the Family Division proceedings.  Accordingly, we 
transferred the matter back to the district court for further proceedings. 
 On remand, the case was reassigned to a district judge, and Addlespurger then 
filed an amended complaint, alleging, in a rambling, unclear, and disorganized fashion, 
that 13 defendants violated his constitutional rights, essentially by prosecuting and 
imprisoning him pursuant to child support and contempt orders.  The complaint contained 
allegations of fraud, forgery, harassment, and conspiracy.  Addlespurger sought money 
damages, and named as defendants former Attorney General Tom Corbett and Daniel 
Richards of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare’s Bureau of Child Support 
Enforcement (the “State defendants”); several Family Division judges and administrators, 
including President Judge Donna Jo McDaniels, Administrative Judge Kim Berkeley 
Clark, Judge David Wecht, Court Administrator Raymond Billotte, and Family Division 
Administrator Patrick Quinn (the “judicial defendants”); Allegheny County Executive 
Dan Onorato, District Attorney Steven Zappala, Court Records Director Kate Barkman, 
Warden Ramon Rustin, and Solicitor Michael Wojcik (the “County defendants”); and 
Sheriff William Mullen.    
The defendants moved in their respective groups to dismiss the amended 
complaint, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6); each group and Sheriff Mullen raised numerous 
bases for dismissing the amended complaint.  In an order entered on August 1, 2011, the 
District Court granted the motions and dismissed the amended complaint.  The court 
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painstakingly worked through the counts in the complaint, and determined that there was 
no basis for the action to proceed.  In an order entered on September 20, 2011, the 
District Court denied a timely filed motion for reconsideration.  Addlespurger appeals.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The majority of the appellees have moved 
in their respective groups for summary affirmance of the District Court’s orders 
dismissing the amended complaint and motion for reconsideration.  Addlespurger has 
submitted a response in opposition to summary action, which we have considered.  
We will summarily affirm.  Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, we 
may summarily dispose of an appeal when it clearly appears that no substantial question 
is presented by the appeal.  We exercise plenary review over a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, 
see Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2001), and we “are free” to 
affirm the judgment “on any basis which finds support in the record,” see Bernitsky v. 
United States, 620 F.2d 948, 950 (3d Cir. 1980).  A motion to dismiss should be granted 
if the plaintiff is unable to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  The plausibility 
standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).   
As explained by the District Court, Addlespurger’s claims in the main flow from 
defendant Judge David Wecht’s having issued orders with the intent of carrying out 
Pennsylvania’s child support laws.  Judges are absolutely immunized from a civil rights 
suit for money damages arising from their judicial acts.  Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 
(1991) (per curiam); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978).  The order of a 
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judge entered against Addlespurger in the Family Division proceedings may not serve as 
a basis for a civil action for damages.  See id.  In addition, the defendant court 
administrators are similarly absolutely immunized from a suit for damages under the 
doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity, because their activities were an integral part of the 
judicial process.  A court administrator or deputy administrator, who is charged with the 
duty of carrying out facially valid court orders, enjoys quasi-judicial immunity from 
liability for damages in a suit challenging conduct prescribed by that order.  See Gallas v. 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 772-73 (3d Cir. 2000).  See also Kincaid 
v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 601 (7
th
 Cir. 1992); Valdez v. City and County of Denver, 878 
F.2d 1285, 1288-90 (10
th
 Cir. 1989).  Sheriff Mullin’s involvement in the alleged civil 
rights violations was based on the actions of his deputies, who jailed Addlespurger 
pursuant to Judge Wecht’s orders.  He too is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity under 
these circumstances.  Accordingly, dismissal of the amended complaint against Judges 
Wecht and Clark, Deputy Administrator Quinn, and Sheriff Mullins was proper.
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The action against President Judge McDaniels and Court Administrator Billotte 
was properly dismissed because a civil rights claim cannot proceed exclusively on a 
theory of respondeat superior.  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 
                                              
1
 There appears to be a claim of “extortion” against defendant Quinn with respect 
to the precise calculation of the monthly child support payments under Pennsylvania Rule 
of Civil Procedure 1910.16-1, see Amended Complaint, at ¶¶ 10-12, 20-21, but, to state a 
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of a right secured by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).  An 
allegation of a violation of the state child support rules will not suffice and thus this claim 
properly was dismissed.  The claim against State defendant Daniel Richards in his 
individual capacity (he was alleged to have collaborated with defendant Quinn) fails for 
the same reason. 
6 
 
1988).  Liability under section 1983 cannot be imposed absent personal involvement in 
the alleged actions, see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-77 (1976); Chincello v. 
Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133-34 (3d Cir. 1986).  As to the County defendants, 
Addlespurger’s claims are especially unclear, but, again, there do not appear to be any 
allegations of personal involvement in the purported violation of his rights, and liability 
cannot proceed on a theory of respondeat superior, see id.  Accordingly, the amended 
complaint was properly dismissed as to the County defendants as well.  Addlespurger’s 
motion for reconsideration did not cure these deficiencies. 
As to the State defendants, to the extent they were sued in their official capacity, 
the claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.  Any official capacity claim fails 
because the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General and Pennsylvania Department 
of Public Welfare share in the immunity conferred to the States by the Eleventh 
Amendment.  See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-27 (1991); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State 
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).  The claims against former Attorney General Corbett in 
his individual capacity fail because Addlespurger failed to allege any personal 
involvement in the purported violation of his rights, Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 375-77; 
Chincello, 805 F.2d at 133-34. 
Last, Addlespurger alleged that he was routinely subjected to strip searches, upon 
being jailed for contempt, pursuant to a policy established by County defendant Warden 
Rustin.  See Amended Complaint, at ¶ 65.  These searches, he alleged, violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  The District Court properly held that this claim was foreclosed by our 
decision in Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 311 (3d Cir. 2010), 
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petition for cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1816 (2011), in view of the fact that Addlespurger 
does not allege that any of the searches were conducted in an unreasonable manner.  In 
addition, the allegations of a conspiracy among the defendants to violate Addlespurger’s 
civil rights does not survive Rule 12(b)(6).  “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a 
right to relief above the speculative level....”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.  Furthermore, 
there is no private cause of action for a violation of the federal mail and wire fraud 
statutes, and we agree with the District Court’s disposition of Addlespurger’s excessive 
force and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the appellees’ motions, and summarily 
affirm the orders of the District Court dismissing the amended complaint and denying the 
motion for reconsideration.
2
   
                                              
2 We do so without regard to whether the appellees specifically moved for summary 
affirmance. 
